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3D Printing and US Copyright Law
Peter S. Menell * & Ryan Vacca **
The emergence of 3D printing—the use of computer-aided design (CAD) files 1 with threedimensional deposition, extrusion, and sintering devices—has opened a new front in the digital
revolution. Designers can now manufacture objects directly from computer software using
increasingly available and versatile 3D printing devices. This new and expanding functionality
promises to enhance creativity and reduce costs across a wide range of industries. 3D printing is
now being used to “print” toys, apparel, machine parts, medical devices, body parts, drugs,
firearms, and even entire buildings.
3D printing has opened up new distribution channels for design, print-on-demand aftermarkets,
and customizable product lines. Businesses no longer need to stock large inventories of parts.
Consumers now have the ability to download or scan and reconstruct a broken component for a
household appliance in their home.
Nevertheless, with these opportunities come risks and challenges. Designs and CAD files, like
any other digital files, can be easily reproduced and disseminated without authorization. Product
manufacturers are seeing new competition for replacement parts by a new layer of “after-market”
competitors. Designers are seeing their work product scanned and disseminated without
authorization. All manner of physical goods are being “Napsterized” 2 in the 3D printing
revolution. The potential applications of 3D printing, as well as the intellectual property and
broader legal ramifications, are wide-ranging and only beginning to come into focus.
This article explores how 3D printing fits within US copyright law. US copyright law provides
a well-developed general framework for the protection of creative designs, whether fixed in CAD
files or 3D objects. Enforcement of copyright protection in this industry faces some of the same
challenges encountered by other content industries whose works were disrupted by the digital
revolution. Nonetheless, 3D printing brings distinctive issues. Although grounded in statute, US
copyright law has a rich common law tradition that affords courts significant leeway in adapting
doctrines to new and unforeseen technological developments. 3 This capacity is reinforced by the
range of business strategies available for confronting appropriability challenges. Thus, this article
surveys the 3D printing terrain on three levels: (I) copyrightability of CAD files and 3D objects;
(II) enforcement challenges; and (III) business strategies.

*

Koret Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law.
**
Interim Co-Dean, David L. Brennan Professor of Law, and Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law &
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1
Although there are a variety of file types associated with 3D printing, such as STL and VRML, we use the term CAD
to refer to all the file formats.
2
See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital
Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); see also Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster:
3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1691 (2014).
3
See Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for Statutory
Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 63 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
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I. Copyrightability
US copyright law has long protected graphical and sculptural works. 4 Its originality threshold,
idea-expression doctrine, and useful article doctrine come into play in addressing the
copyrightability of CAD files and objects.
A. Originality
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act extends copyright protection to “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” The originality threshold requires only
that a work be independently created 5 and reflect a modicum of originality. 6 The statute does not
require “novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit.” 7
Thus, independently created ornamental designs and three-dimensional sculptures, fixed in
CAD files or physical objects, generally qualify for copyright protection. 8 The originality
threshold can come into play where a designer merely scans an existing object or design, such as
a toy. While faithful imaging may require substantial effort and skill, copyright protection does
not extend to such “sweat of the brow.” 9 There must be creative effort. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
held in Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. 10 that the creation of an exact digital
replica of an automobile chassis lacked sufficient creativity to garner copyright protection.
Although copyright law affords protection for “derivative works,” 11 subsequent creators must
bring forth more than trivial variation from the existing works. In L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder,
the Second Circuit held that a plastic version of a public domain metal Uncle Sam bank did not
constitute sufficient originality because the only changes were in the size and material of the bank,
as well as the shape of the satchel and the substitution of leaves for arrows in the eagle’s talons. 12
These minor changes to the public domain work were too trivial to entitle the derivative work to
copyright protection.
Furthermore, “protection for a work employing preexisting material [such as a sculptural work
created by another] does not extend to any part of the work in which such materials has been used
unlawfully.” 13 Thus, a CAD file that faithfully reproduces a copyright-protected sculptural work
is not protectable unless done by the copyright owner of the underlying work or with that artist’s
authorization.
B. Functionality and the Useful Article Doctrine
4

See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§85-111, 16 Stat. 198, 212-16.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
6
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
7
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976).
8
See Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 949-950 (2012).
9
See Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Desai & Magliocca, supra note 2, at 170607.
10
528 F.3d 1258, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2008).
11
“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a ‘derivative work’.” 17 U.S.C. §101 (definition of “derivative work”).
12
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489 (2nd Cir. 1976).
13
17 U.S.C. §103(a).
5
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Copyright law’s exclusion of protection for functional aspects of works of authorship erects a
more significant barrier to copyrightability of CAD files and three-dimensional objects. Section
102(b) bars protection for any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”
Furthermore, although copyright protection extends to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”
(PGS works), 14 the useful article doctrine excludes protection for those aspects of a PGS work that
cannot “be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.” 15 The House Report accompanying the Copyright Act refers to both
physical and conceptual separability. 16
An expressive element of a useful article is physically separable if it can stand alone from the
article as a whole “by ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article completely
intact.” 17 For example, Jaguar’s iconic leaping cat hood ornament is physically separable from the
car because it can be physically removed from the car without impairing the ability to drive the
vehicle. Thus, decorative sculptural features reflected in a CAD file or a 3D printed object are
eligible for copyright protection if they can be physically separated from the utilitarian features of
a depicted or physical design.
More difficult separability issues arise when form and function are tightly integrated, as, for
example, in Apple’s iPod products. In Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber
Co., 18 a case involving the now iconic ribbon bicycle rack, the Second Circuit adopted a test that
focuses on the designer’s intent: “if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional
considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the
utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as reflecting the
designer’s artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual
separability exists.” 19 Professor Paul Goldstein has suggested the following formulation: “[A]
pictorial, graphic or sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a useful article is conceptually
separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article
in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it.” 20 The courts, however, have struggled
to develop a uniform, straightforward test for conceptual separability. 21
The myriad tests for conceptual separability pose a problem for 3D printing. 22 Many 3D
printing designs combine aesthetic and functional features. The lack of a single, easy-to-apply test
for conceptual separability exacerbates the uncertainty surrounding copyright protection and
infringement for the 3D printing industry.
14
17 U.S.C. §102(a)(5) (a “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including
architectural plans”).
15
See id. (limiting the scope of protection for PGS works).
16
See H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).
17
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §924.2(A) (3rd ed. 2014); Esquire,
Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
18
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
19
Id. at 1145.
20
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §2.5.3.1.
21
See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 496-497 (6th Cir. 2015) (McKeague, J., dissenting)
(observing that “[t]he law in this area is a mess—and it has been for a long time”), cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 1823
(2016).
22
Brief of Amici Curiae FormLabs Inc., Matter and Form, Inc., and Shapeways, Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2-4,
Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866 (Feb. 8, 2016), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 628.
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The Copyright Act limits the owner of copyright in a CAD file that captures a sculptural work
in the public domain or created by someone else “to the expressive creativity contributed by the
CAD file author, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does
not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.” 23 Thus, the maker of a CAD file that
merely portrays a pre-existing sculptural work designed by someone else does not thereby acquire
any rights in the design. CAD files are essentially digital versions of technical drawings. 24 As a
result, if someone creates a CAD file for printing a useful article designed by another person, such
as a prosthetic limb, the creator of the CAD file would be unable to prevent anyone else from
recreating the prosthetic limb. 25 That said, the copyright owner of the CAD file might have a valid
copyright in the computer software file itself. Therefore, the CAD file owner might still enforce
its copyright against those who reproduce and distribute the CAD file, although even that copyright
could be invalid if created without authorization. 26 As the next section explores, the owner of that
file faces legal and practical challenges enforcing its copyright.
II. Enforcement Challenges
The ease with which sculptural works can be scanned into digital files that can be easily and
anonymously shared through cyberspace in conjunction with the growing availability of 3D
printing devices has opened up the potential for widespread unauthorized reproduction and
distribution of designs. Like the music industry following the emergence of Internet file-sharing, 27
the design industry faces a growing threat to copyright protection of its creative works.
Nonetheless, the broad range of design markets (from sophisticated high technology products to
high art sculptures and simple figurines and toys), the limited protection for useful articles, and
various other distinctive factors suggest that 3D printing will blaze new trails for copyright
enforcement and business strategy.
The problem of online infringement can usefully be characterizing as a layered pyramid, with
the top of the pyramid representing core Internet functionality (the backbone providers).
Computer, printer, and other hardware manufacturers represent the next layer, followed by Internet
Service Providers and software application vendors (such as search engines and websites). End
users populate the wide base of the pyramid. Copyright owners face a daunting series of practical
and legal complexities in choosing how to target copyright infringement within this hierarchy.
Decapitating the pyramid provides a simple, but vastly over-inclusive, solution. Society loses the
vast non-infringing uses and communication capabilities of the Internet. The Sony staple article of
commerce doctrine 28 and the §512 Online Service Provider safe harbor 29 limit the indirect liability
of vendors and service providers in the middle and top layers of the pyramid. Yet going after the
lowest level of the pyramid—the file-sharers—poses a vast scalability challenge. New sources of
infringement spring up faster than existing sources can be taken down. Since indirect liability
23

17 U.S.C. §103(b).
Frank Ward, Patents & 3D Printing: Protecting the Democratization of Manufacturing by Combining Existing
Intellectual Property Protections, 25 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 110, 114, 124 (2014).
25
The CAD file would constitute a derivative work. Under 17 U.S.C. §106(2), the author of such CAD file would
need authorization from the owner of copyright in the sculptural work.
26
See 17 U.S.C. §103(a).
27
See generally Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 98-199
(2002-2003).
28
See Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
29
See 17 U.S.C. §512.
24
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requires an underlying finding of direct infringement, we will work our way up through the digital
liability pyramid from the bottom. It will be useful to examine several practical and procedural
issues before turning to direct and indirect copyright liability.
A. Threshold Enforcement Issues
The architecture of the Internet and other digital distribution platforms presents substantial
challenges for copyright owners. Detecting sources of infringement can be often be difficult,
especially when works are shared through covert networks and complex file-sharing systems such
as Bittorrent. And even where infringements or possible infringements can be identified through
general Internet searches, the website owners might not be easily identified. Copyright owners
might need to file a lawsuit to pursue discovery of website owners. Furthermore, the websites
might be controlled outside of the reach of US courts, requiring copyright owners to pursue
violations through foreign legal systems.
Even when the file-sharer can be pursued in court, the amount of recovery might not justify
the enforcement costs. Although US copyright law authorizes a broad arsenal of remedies, 30
including injunctive relief and statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work infringed for willful
infringement, the practical reality is that shutting down individual file-sharers will likely have little
discernible effect on the availability of copies of files on the Internet. 31 Moreover, judges are
reluctant to impose crushing liability on non-commercial file-sharers. 32 And even when they do,
the defendants may well be judgment-proof. Moreover, overly punitive enforcement against filesharers can contribute to pathological social norms that fuel infringement. 33 The government can
also pursue criminal enforcement actions for willful infringement, 34 although such small-scale
activity does not rank high on prosecutor’s priority list.
There are, however, several distinctions between music file-sharing and CAD file sharing that
point toward more robust private and public copyright enforcement. 3D printing could pull largerscale commercial enterprises into file-sharing. File-sharing of valuable replacement parts could
well be worth pursuing by original developers of those products. Such file-sharing could have
significant financial effects and, to the extent that the CAD files are flawed or the instructions are
inaccurate, could threaten the reputation of the original source. Furthermore, the government could
take a greater interest in pursuing some entrants, 35 especially where the products affect public
health or safety.
30

17 U.S.C. § 502-505.
See Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J.
1483, 1496-97 (2014).
32
See Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright for the Internet Age,
61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 263-64 (2014); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217,
237 (D. Mass. 2009).
33
See Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel, & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011).
34
17 U.S.C. §506.
35
Note that the government pursued the operators of MegaUpload, a large, commercial cyber-locker enterprise that
contributed significantly to the level of file-sharing of entertainment industry works. See NATE ANDERSON, THE
INTERNET POLICE: HOW CRIME WENT ONLINE, AND THE COPS FOLLOWED 199-202 (2013); cf. U.S. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2012 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR JOINT
STRATEGIC PLAN
1
(June
2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_twoyear_anniversary_report.pdf. Similarly, several foreign governments have pursued the operators of The Pirate Bay.
See Stephen Bright, Current Development, The Current State of BitTorrent in International Law: Why Copyright Law
is Ineffective and What Needs to Change, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 266 (2011).
31
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B. Direct Liability
Assuming copyright protection subsists in a CAD file or other digital instantiations of a
sculptural work based on the considerations canvassed in Part I, the copyright owner would be
able to pursue those who reproduce literal or substantially similar copies of the copyrighted work
without authorization subject to various statutory and doctrinal limitations, such as fair use. The
copyright owner would also be able to pursue violations of the right to prepare derivative works
for unauthorized adaptations of the copyrighted work, the right to distribute the copyrighted work
by transmitting the copyrighted work (or possibly merely making the work available), and the right
to display the work publicly (for example by posting images of the design on a website).
1. Reproduction Right
Section 106(1) imposes liability on those who reproduce copyrighted works without
authorization, subject to the fair use privilege or defense and a variety of other limitations and
compulsory licenses that are unlikely to apply to CAD file reproduction. The right to reproduce
granted by §106(1) is not limited to literal reproduction. Rather, it protects against the unauthorized
making of “substantially similar” reproductions of protected expression.
To prove a violation of the reproduction right, US copyright law requires the copyright
owner to establish actual copying of protected expression resulting in substantial similarity. Thus,
independent creation is a complete defense. Furthermore, the exclusion of unoriginal and
functional features of useful articles and computer software limit the range of protected expression
in a work. Others are free to copy those features, although it is important to recognize that original
selections and arrangements of even unprotected features can attract copyright protection as
compilations. Such compilations, however, are entitled to only thin protection. 36
Nonetheless, the wholesale reproduction of CAD files or the printing of the entirety of even
thinly protected objects will, in most cases, violate the reproduction right. 37 The act of
downloading and storing a CAD file in the computer memory of a 3D printer constitutes a
reproduction of a copyrighted work. 38 Similarly, companies such as Shapeways, which print usersubmitted designs and then ship the product to the customer, face liability for infringing the
reproduction right.
US copyright law has long recognized a fair use privilege or defense. The doctrine
originated in jurisprudence, 39 and was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 107 provides
several factors to balance in determining whether a use is fair. 40 The legislative history notes that

36

Courts require “virtual identity” or “bodily appropriation” to find infringement of such works. See Mattel, Inc. v.
MGA Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2010); Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual
Technologies, 400 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2005).
37
Haritha Dasari, Note, Assessing Copyright Protection and Infringement Issues Involved with 3D Printing and
Scanning, 41 AIPLA QUARTERLY JOURNAL 279, 306-307 (2013); Ben Depoorter, Intellectual Property Infringements
& 3D Printing: Decentralized Piracy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1483, 1488 (2014).
38
See Eli Greenbaum, Three-Dimensional Printing and Open-Source Hardware, 2 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L.
257, 276 (2013).
39
See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
40
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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“courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis”
“especially during a period of rapid technological change.” 41
Courts have long considered the commerciality of the use—particularly the effect on the
potential market for the copyrighted work—to be of prime significance. 42 Courts increasingly
emphasize the “transformativeness” of the use, which focuses on the extent to which the
defendant’s use is productive, employs the protected work in a different manner or purpose, or
brings new information, aesthetics, insights, or understandings. 43
Lacking some educational or research purpose, direct reproduction of CAD files and
underlying copyrighted works are unlikely to benefit from the fair use doctrine. The fair use
doctrine is more likely to come into play in the context of adaptations of such works.
2. Derivative Work Right
Section 106(2) grants “copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work.” Thus, a photograph or scan of copyrighted two- or three-dimensional
work implicates the derivative work or adaptation right. The statute defines a derivative work as
“a work based upon one or more preexisting works. . . . A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a ’derivative work.’” 44
The test for infringement of the derivative work right parallels the test for infringement of the
reproduction right. Courts assess whether the defendant’s work copies the copyrighted work to
such an extent that there is substantial similarity of protected expression. Thus, faithfully scanning
a copyrighted object infringes copyright in that sculptural work. Likewise, those who download
and modify CAD files likely violate the adaptation right, as well as those who subsequently print
the modified product.
While those who modify a copyrighted CAD file or object fall within the ambit of the §106(2)
right, they may nonetheless qualify for the fair use privilege to the extent their adaptation
transforms the underlying work in a sufficiently productive way. Innovations in digital technology
have democratized the ability for users and consumers to adapt existing works in innovative
ways. 45
3. Distribution Right
Section 106(3) grants copyright owners the “exclusive right to do and to authorize” the
following: “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” This right grows out of the historic
rights “to publish” and “to vend” recognized by earlier copyright statutes. It is closely allied with
the right to copy, since reproduction has been the principal means of exploiting works of authorship
for most of copyright’s history. Thus, copying and selling a copyright owner’s work without
authorization violates both the right to copy and the right to distribute. As a corollary, both the
41

See H.R. REP. 94-1476 at 66 (1976).
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
43
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
44
17 U.S.C. §101 (2016).
45
See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2006).
42
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copier who never does anything with his or her copies and the unknowing distributor of
unauthorized copies are liable for copyright infringement. Section 602 of the Copyright Act
augments the distribution right by affording copyright owners the right to block importation or
exportation of copies, subject to limited exceptions. 46
Prior to the emergence of file-sharing technology, the Copyright Act’s distribution right was
largely dormant as most enforcement actions were premised upon violations of the reproduction
right. With the proliferation of files-sharing over the Internet, direct enforcement of the Copyright
Act against file-sharers has brought the scope of the distribution right to center stage because many
individual defendants are charged with allowing access to shared folders containing copyrighted
files. Reproduction occurs through download of files by others.
The ramifications for copyright enforcement in the Internet age are substantial. Under the
narrow interpretation, the relative anonymity of Internet transmissions in combination with privacy
concerns make enforcement costly and difficult. A broad interpretation exposes millions of filesharers to potentially crushing statutory damages.
The drafters expressly intended to broaden the reach of the “publish” and “vend” rights. The
reason for the change in terminology was to avoid some of the confusing jurisprudential baggage
that had formed around the meaning of “publication.” The courts remain divided over the proper
interpretation of the distribution right in file-sharing cases. 47 The US Copyright Office has
endorsed the broader interpretation based on the legislative history as well as conformance with
international treaty obligations. 48 In any case, the fact that a forensic expert hired by the copyright
owner was able to find the copyrighted work in a file-sharing folder controlled by the defendant
relatively easily—by, for example, searching for a work’s title or artist on widely available search
engines—is sufficient to establish that it was more probable than not that the work was distributed.
Congress carved out an important limitation on the exclusive right to distribute. The “first sale
doctrine” provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” 49 This doctrine
has a long pedigree. 50 The purchaser/recipient of an authorized copy may resell, lease, donate, or
dispose of it without restriction, but may not copy it. In response to the availability of home
copying technologies, Congress limited the first sale doctrine by prohibiting the rental of
phonorecords and computer programs for profit, fearing that the primary effect of such rentals was
to encourage piracy. 51

46

See 17 U.S.C. §602(a)(3) (exceptions for government use (but not including schools), personal copies for private
use, and scholarly, education, or religious purposes (nut not more than five copies). Section 602(b) prohibits
importation of infringing copies.
47
Compare Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1202 n.7 (10th Cir. 2013) with London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
48
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE MAKING AVAILABLE RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER
(Feb. 2016); Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet
Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (2011).
49
17 U.S.C. §109(a).
50
See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
51
See §109(b); Ryan Vacca, Expanding Preferential Treatment Under the Record Rental Amendment Beyond the
Music Industry, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 612-14 (2007).
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The emergence of 3D printing opens up the need for a new copyright doctrine paralleling patent
law’s repair and reconstruction doctrine. 52 Under the exhaustion principle, the first unrestricted
sale of a patented product exhausts the patentee’s control over that product and it can be resold
and repaired without implicating the patent owner’s rights. Nonetheless, courts have longrecognized that purchasers of patented products have an inherent right to repair such goods,
although they may not reconstruct the patented technology. 53
Suppose a consumer purchases a copyrighted useful article and some component breaks.
Should that consumer be able to invoke the first-sale doctrine to justify scanning the broken
component so as to print a replacement? Alternatively, would that consumer be justified under a
hybrid first-sale/fair use principle, in accessing a copyrighted CAD file for purposes of effecting a
repair? Would a vendor of the copyrighted useful article be able to override such acts through
contractual restrictions? 54 Just as the emergence of licensed computer software created the
conditions for development of the copyright misuse doctrine, 55 the emergence of 3D printing
hastens the development of a copyright repair doctrine. The brave new world of 3D printing opens
up these and related questions. 56
4. Public Display Right
The Copyright Act grants owners of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works” the exclusive
right to display such works publicly. 57 Section 101 defines “display” broadly: “to show a copy of
[the work], either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or
process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially.” Users posting images of copyrighted products on file-sharing web sites, or even
social media accounts, display a copy of the product by means of a computer.
Publicly displaying a work includes “transmit[ting] or otherwise communicat[ing] a . . . display
of the work to a place [open to the public or where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered] or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the . . . display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 58
Posting images on a publicly accessible website constitutes a public display of the copyrighted
work. As with the reproduction and adaptation rights, fair use may limit liability under the public
display right. Furthermore, section 113(c) permits owners of lawfully reproduced useful articles
“that have been offered for sale or other distribution to the public” to make, distribute, or display

52
See Kelsey B. Wilbanks, Comment, The Challenges of 3D Printing to the Repair-Reconstruction Doctrine in Patent
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147 (2013).
53
See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §16.03[3], at 16-449 to -450 (2012); Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Co., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336 (1961).
54
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“pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with advertisements or commentaries
related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news reports.”
C. Indirect Liability
The potential liability of enterprises higher in the copyright enforcement pyramid—such as
search engines, CAD file-sharing services, 3D printing shops, and 3D printer manufacturers—
stems less from their direct infringement than from indirect liability doctrines. As noted above,
some of these actors could face direct liability for reproducing, adapting, distributing, or publicly
displaying copyrighted works. 3D printing file-sharing services, such as Thingiverse or Pinshape,
allow users to post CAD files online for others to download and use to print objects. More
significantly, however, they are attractive targets because of their ability to contribute to,
vicariously benefit from, and induce copyright infringement on a broader scale due to their
upstream location in the digital enforcement pyramid. Moreover, these actors are likely to facilitate
a broader range and number of infringing acts and have deeper pockets than individual end-users.
Thus as in the music file-sharing context, copyright owners of CAD files and underlying 3D works
would prefer to be able to stanch infringing activity at this higher level. Nonetheless, US copyright
law has various doctrines and safe harbors that limit or shield upstream actors from liability.
This section surveys the indirect copyright liability landscape. Section 1 sketches the historical
development and contours of indirect copyright liability. Section 2 examines the Sony staple article
of commerce, which insulates providers of products or services that are capable of substantial noninfringing use from liability. Section 3 discusses the online service provider safe harbors that
insulate Internet enterprises from indirect copyright liability.
1. Indirect Liability Doctrines
From its origins in 1790 to the present, the US copyright legislation has provided only a general
statement outlining the scope of copyright liability. Even the modern statute states tersely that
“[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following [reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform,
publicly display, digitally perform].” 59 The statutory text only obliquely refers to indirect
liability. 60
Building on the English common law tradition, American courts have long looked to tort law
principles to delineate the contours of copyright liability. 61 By the mid-twentieth century, US
copyright law clearly established a broad panoply of indirect copyright liability doctrines:
respondeat superior, vicarious liability, contributory liability, and inducement liability.
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Respondeat Superior. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a court held a newspaper liable
for publishing a copyrighted map notwithstanding that the work was inserted without the
newspaper’s knowledge or consent. 62 Theatre owners and music stores bore responsibility for
copyright infringements by those who performed copyrighted musical compositions without
authorization, 63 even if done against the employer’s orders. 64
Vicarious Liability. The doctrine of vicarious liability arose to deal with the situation in which
third parties exercise control over or motivate the actions of others and stand to benefit from such
activities. 65 As described by the Second Circuit, “When the right and ability to supervise coalesce
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—even in
the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired—the purposes of
copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that
exploitation.”66
Contributory and Inducement Liability. The Second Circuit has delineated the standards for
contributory copyright liability as follows: “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable
as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” 67 Thus, in Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distribs., 68 an electronics
store which sold blank tapes and made available both pre-recorded tapes of copyrighted works and
a high speed, coin-operated “Make-A-Tape” system was held contributorily liable for the
infringing activities of its customers.
2. Jurisprudential Limitations on Indirect Liability: The Staple Article of Commerce
Doctrine
The Supreme Court established a significant limitation on indirect copyright liability in Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 69 Following the introduction of
videocassette recording technology by Sony in 1976, motion picture studios alleged that Sony
contributorily infringed the studios’ copyrights by providing the means (the Betamax video
cassette recorder) by which Sony customers directly infringed film and television program
copyrights. The case raised complex issues surrounding indirect liability (does an upstream device
manufacturer bear responsibility for infringing acts of device users?) and direct liability (is timeshifting or archiving of television broadcasts (along with the advertisements that provide the
principal revenue stream to broadcasters) fair use?).
Although holding that time-shifting of programming was fair use, the Court failed to resolve
whether making archival copies constituted fair use. This necessitated addressing the scope of
indirect liability. Drawing from patent law, 70 the Supreme Court stated that “the sale of copying
62
McDonald v. Hearst, 95 F. 656 (D.C. Cal. 1899); see also Leon et al. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 487
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63
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(E.D.S.C. 1924), aff'd mem., 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648, 649
(W.D. La. 1942); Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F. Supp. 745, 747 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
64
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65
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equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” 71
This doctrine is of particular importance to manufacturers and distributors of 3D printers.
Although some consumers directly infringe when they print, 3D printers are capable of substantial
non-infringing uses. They are capable of producing uncopyrightable useful articles, such as
prostheses, tools, and replacement parts. Moreover, there is an extensive community of designers
who freely share their designs and authorize modification and printing of the products. 72 These
uses do not even take into account whether printing copyrightable products constitutes fair use.
There is, however, an exception to Sony’s substantial non-infringing use doctrine. In MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 73 the Supreme Court recognized that even the
distributor of a product or service that is capable of substantial non-infringing use could be liable
for inducing infringement if it “distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” 74
To steer clear of Grokster’s inducement standard, 3D printer manufacturers should avoid
advertising infringing uses or works and instead promote the multitude of available non-infringing
uses.
3. Statutory Limitations on Indirect Copyright Liability: The Online Service Provider
Safe Harbor
As the Internet emerged as a major communications and commercial medium in the mid1990s, the new breed of commercial enterprises providing online access faced the specter of
crushing indirect copyright liability as a result of infringing online activity by their users. Congress
confronted this threat by establishing the online service provider (OSP) safe harbor provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 75
Section 512(c), which deals with “information residing on systems or networks at [the]
direction of users,” is of most relevance to the emerging 3D printing industry. 76 This safe harbor
affords websites hosting user-generated content, such as YouTube, Shapeways, Thingiverse, and
Pinshape, with immunity from monetary liability for infringing acts of file uploaders and
downloaders. To qualify for the safe harbor, storage websites must comply with three general
threshold conditions as well as several storage-related conditions.
To comply with the general threshold conditions, the OSP must: (i) adopt, implement, and
inform its subscribers of its policy for terminating service to users who are repeat copyright
infringers; (ii) adopt standard technical measures used by copyright owners to identify and protect
copyrighted works; and (iii) designate an agent to receive notification of claimed infringement
from copyright owners and register that agent with the Copyright Office.
71
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To comply with the additional requirements of §512(c), the OSP must not have actual
knowledge of the infringing conduct 77 nor be “aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent.” 78 Courts interpreting the knowledge standard have set the bar fairly
high. Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have rejected a standard that removes the safe-harbor if
the service provider has generalized knowledge of infringement. 79 Instead, these courts require
providers to know or be aware of facts or circumstances indicating “specific and identifiable
instances of infringement.” 80 In addition, OSPs must expeditiously remove allegedly infringing
content after being notified by a copyright owner. 81 OSPs satisfying these requirements are
shielded from monetary relief and most forms of equitable relief. Importantly, the statute exempts
OSPs from any affirmative duty to monitor activity on their website. 82
CAD file-sharing sites are similar to other file-sharing websites that receive DMCA immunity
from indirect copyright liability. Like YouTube, they should be able to stay within the protection
of the §512(c) safe harbor even though they are generally aware that some of the uploaded files
infringe copyrighted works. They must, however, designate an agent to receive takedown notices,
expeditiously respond to such notices, and create and implement policies for terminating repeat
infringers. 83 A survey of 3D printing file-sharing sites indicates they are attempting to take
advantage of the safe-harbors. 84
Although CAD file-sharing sites can qualify for the OSP safe harbor, they might still face
liability for inducing copyright infringement. There is a split in the courts as to whether the DMCA
insulates OSPs from inducement claims. 85 As explained earlier with respect to 3D printer
manufacturers, these sites can steer clear of inducement exposure by avoiding any language or acts
that encourage copyright infringement and instead promote the non-infringing uses of their
website, such as to disseminate non-infringing CAD files. The Fung case 86 highlights practices to
be avoided.
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The DMCA affords users of storage websites a cause of action against over-zealous copyright
owners who make dubious takedown requests. 87 Section 512(f) imposes liability on anyone who
“knowingly materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is infringing.” 88 Copyright
owners making takedown requests must consider whether an allegedly infringing work would
qualify for the fair use privilege. 89
The DMCA places the burden of policing infringement on copyright owners. Yet copyright
owners can effectively impose substantial costs on OSPs by issuing numerous takedown requests.
As more sites emerge and more designs are uploaded, policing becomes an increasingly difficult
task. Film and music copyright owners alleviated some of this burden by collaborating with filesharing services to create and implement automated filtering technologies. 90 Such collaborations
may prove useful in the design file-sharing arena as 3D printing expands.
III. Business Strategies
Although design copyright owners may have legal grounds to enforce their copyrights against
infringers in the emerging 3D printing field, the costs of doing so are significant and the efficacy
is questionable. The major music and film companies abandoned large-scale direct enforcement
against end-users after that approach proved counterproductive 91 and have focused their attention
on selective enforcement 92 and making their works more widely available through innovative,
user-friendly, and better priced licensed channels, such as subscription and streaming services and
closer working relationships with YouTube.
The 3D printing revolution brings a range of distinctive business strategy and public policy
issues into play. Product manufacturing and design businesses affected by 3D printing are highly
heterogeneous. Sophisticated, mission-sensitive equipment manufacturers and parts suppliers have
very different concerns than fine art sculptors and toy and apparel makers. Some of these
businesses see tremendous benefits from entering the 3D printing arena as a means of better
meeting customer demand for customized products and reducing inventory, manufacturing, and
distribution costs. Yet these same companies are prone to competition and reputational harm from
new entities entering after-markets for replacement parts, customization, and repair services. In
addition, their business reputation can suffer to the extent consumers are confused as to the source
and quality of replacement parts and repair services. Public safety can also be undermined to the
extent lower quality and confusingly sourced replacement parts enter the market. Innovation and
87

See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First
Amendment, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 171, 178 (2010).
88
17 U.S.C. §512(f)(1).
89
See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015).
90
See Peter S. Menell, Design for Symbiosis: Promoting More Harmonious Paths for Technological Innovators and
Expressive Creators in the Internet Age, 55 COMM. OF THE ACM, No. 5, 30-32 (May 2012).
91
See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 19,
2008). Some independent film companies, notably pornography enterprises, continue to sue direct infringers and filesharers. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (2015).
92
The major music and film industries have continued to pursue OSPs that allegedly induce widespread infringing
activities. See, e.g., Stuart Dredge, ‘Popcorn Time of music’ Aurous shut down before it ever really started, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/10/popcorn-time-music-aurous-shutdown; Ernesto, MPAA: We Shut Down YTS/YIFY and Popcorn Time, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-we-shut-down-ytsyify-and-popcorn-time-151103/; Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (2013); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (2010) (shutting down
the file-sharing network Limewire).

14

consumer interests, however, can suffer to the extent that original manufacturing companies block
legitimate after-market competition for replacement parts, repair services, and other secondary
markets. 93
This section explores two sets of business strategies that turn on or interact with copyright law.
Section A examines the use of encryption or digital rights management strategies to reduce the
risks of CAD file piracy. Section B examines the use of licensing agreements to control the
distribution of designs.
A. Digital Rights Management
Like other software products, CAD files can be distributed with encryption or technological
protection measures (TPMs) that prevent or limit their reproduction without authorization of the
manufacturer. The DMCA established a special “para-copyright” regime that prohibits
circumvention of TPMs. 94 These provisions go beyond traditional copyright protection in that they
prohibit specific acts, such as decrypting TPMs, trafficking in anti-circumvention devices such as
encryption keys, or removing copyright management information, whether or not such acts result
in copyright infringement. Content industries advocated for these protections in the belief that they
could prevent online piracy through the use of digital rights management (DRM) technologies.
The anti-circumvention provisions aim for significant deterrent civil and criminal remedies. 95
The efficacy of DRM for product and design companies will depend on the nature of their
products and limitations on enforcement of anti-circumvention provisions. DRM works most
effectively for works, like computer software code, that cannot be gleaned merely from examining
a product. This strategy is deployed with great success in the video game marketplace. 96 Although
consumers (and competitors) can view the screen outputs of video games, they cannot see (or
reproduce) the computer code that generates the audiovisual outputs without decrypting the
computer code. Similarly, CAD files protected by DRM can be controlled so as to prevent access
to the underlying code. The files can be designed to only work with authorized printers. They can
also limit the number of copies made or the duration of access to the files’ functionality.
Alternatively, instead of permitting consumers to download a CAD file, modify it, and print it,
content owners could stream the CAD file to consumers’ networked 3D printers. 97 For consumers
who simply want an error-free copy of a product and do not wish to modify it, streaming may
perfectly suit their needs.
Unlike video games, however, the full “output” of the CAD file—a three-dimensional printed
object—can be directly perceived, studied, scanned, and reproduced. Thus, the degree of
protection available from DRM is limited. Nonetheless, to the extent that the object can be only
imperfectly reproduced from the physical object—like a video capture of a DVD—and high
precision is important to consumers, DRM can be somewhat effective. 98
The DMCA anti-circumvention regime will also be of only limited effectiveness as an antipiracy protection due to several exceptions within the statutory regime. The DMCA expressly
93
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authorizes reverse engineering of computer programs for the “sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an
independently created computer program.” 99 In addition, as a safety valve to prevent undue
impingement of fair use of copyrighted works and other public policy purposes, the DMCA
contains various exemptions for law enforcement activities, radio and television broadcasters,
libraries, encryption researchers, filtering of content to prevent access by minors, and protection
for personally identifying information. 100 It also authorizes the Copyright Office to establish
specific exemptions for any classes of copyrighted works where persons making non-infringing
uses are likely to be adversely affected by the anti-circumvention ban. 101 The Copyright Office
issues new exemptions on a triennial basis.
Of particular relevance to 3D printing, the Copyright Office and the courts have sought to
prevent the anti-circumvention provisions from being used to control after-markets lacking a
legitimate nexus to the protection of copyrightable expression. 102 Furthermore, the copyright
misuse doctrine could come into play. 103 These considerations limit the use of the Copyright Act’s
anti-circumvention provisions to control products for functional designs that do not have separable
copyrightable expression. Nonetheless, product manufacturers could still use DRM to control
reproduction and access to their design information. They would not, however, be able to use the
Copyright Act’s anti-circumvention provisions to prevent decryption, trafficking in decryption
information, or efforts to alter copyright management information. And they might encounter
antitrust scrutiny.
B. Licensing
The music and film industries ramped up their use of subscription, low-cost download, and
other licensed distribution channels to attract consumers and compete without unauthorized
distributors of their works. 104 Analogously, product manufacturers and designers can deploy
licensing strategies to develop and control markets for 3D printing. 105 Consumers may want the
assurance that they are receiving authentic products that meet the product manufacturer’s
specifications and carry the manufacturer’s warranty. Product designers and repair service
businesses might value licenses, technical assistance, and copyright permission to reproduce,
adapt, and distribute designs.
The toy company Hasbro, for example, has partnered with 3D Systems to bring copyrighted
toy designs such as Mr. Potato Head®, Tonka® trucks, and Transformers® to consumers through
3D print markets. 106 Similarly, Hasbro has partnered with Shapeways so users can create
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customized versions of Hasbro products. 107 Shapeways then 3D prints the item and sends it to the
end users.
Licensing strategies involve context-specific trade-offs for the range of businesses affected by
3D printing technology. Moreover, efforts to collude with potential competitors in horizontal and
related markets could run afoul of antitrust laws.
Copyright law imposes several potential constraints on licensing strategies. US law treats
contracts as a species of state law. Under the US Constitution, state laws cannot interfere or conflict
with federal law. 108 The Copyright Act overrides all “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.”109
US courts are split over whether copyright owners can restrict the fair use privilege and other
limitations on copyright protection through licensing restrictions. 110 They are also split over
whether parties can contract around the first sale doctrine. 111 In addition, the copyright misuse
doctrine limits the ability of licensors to leverage copyright protection through licensing to limit
competition and innovation.
IV. Conclusions
Although bearing some similarities to other disruptive technologies, 3D printing poses a range
of new opportunities and challenges for product manufacturing and design businesses, online
service providers, consumers, designers, and inventors. US copyright law’s general provisions and
principles frame the governance landscape, but the ultimate governance regime will depend upon
the business strategies that copyright owners and disruptive businesses pursue, the extent to which
courts adapt copyright doctrines to new and unforeseen challenges, and the Copyright Office’s
exemptions under the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions.
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